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Tax-Collection Costs, Public Welfare and the Predatory State 
 
 The collection of taxes, in any economic system, clearly requires the use of 
resources. In modern democratic states tax legislation is almost always controversial, and 
subject to extensive lobbying. In developing counties the wealthy often successfully 
avoid payment of taxes and the burden has to be borne by relatively impoverished rural 
classes, who are themselves not easy to tax directly because of poor record -keeping and 
difficulty of communications. In earlier times kings and princes often lacked the 
necessary means of direct taxation and were forced to rely on decentralized institutions 
such as feudalism. 
 
Despite its importance, however, tax-collection costs have been a relatively 
neglected issue in the literature of economics.  Perhaps it is felt that the costs are still 
small relative to the revenue that is raised, and that their effects are too obvious to be 
worth introducing  into theoretical models. 
 
To convince the skeptical reader that the issue of tax-collection costs is neither 
trivial nor obvious, we pose the following question. What is the effect of greater 
efficiency in tax collection on the welfare of the tax-paying public? If the government is 
benign, taxing only to defray socially necessary public expenditure, a reduction in the 
costs of collecting these minimal taxes would clearly be a ‘good thing’. What, however, 
if the state is inherently “predatory” in nature, as argued by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980) and a number of others? In this case the state taxes not only to pay for public 
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services but also to raise revenue for its own, possibly nefarious, purposes. Would an 
increase in the efficiency if tax-collection be undesirable under this alternative scenario? 
 
To answer this question we extend the model of the state presented in Findlay and Wilson 
(1984) and Findlay and Wellisz (2003) to include the explicit resource cost of revenue 
extraction, either by an utterly benign Philosopher-King or a purely self-interested 
Leviathan.  
We begin with the now familiar production function 
 




A(0) =1, A′(Lg) > 0,  A″(Lg) < 0 
 
and the function F is homogenous of first degree with positive first and negative second 
derivatives. The function A(Lg) is a public intermediate input, the “infrastructure”  that 
sustains the productive activities of the private sector, which is assumed to operate with 
perfectly competitive markets. 
 
 The novelty of the present paper is that we specify a Revenue Extraction Function 
 
 R = R(Y, Lt)         (2) 
where 
 
 R = government revenue 
 
 Yt = labor employed for tax-collection 
 
 We assume that the  Revenue Extraction Function has the properties: 
 
  R = 0 if Y= 0 or Lt= 0       (3) 
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and that it is homogenous of the first degree 
 
 λR =R(λY, λLt)        (4) 
 
i.e. multiplication of Y and Lt  by λ also multiplies R by λ. 
 
 These assumptions enable us to treat the extraction of revenue exactly like a 
production function with constant returns to scale. Thus we can picture a family of iso-
revenue contours that are convex  to the origin in a diagram with Y and Lt on the axes, 
just like an isoquant map in input space. We also have: 
 
 ∂R/∂Y > 0,          ∂R/∂Lt > 0       (5) 
 




 ∂2R/∂Y∂Lt = ∂2R/∂Lt∂Y > 0       (7) 
 
Finally we have the labor constraint 
  
 Lg + LP + Lt = L        (8) 
 
 Consider Figure 1 with Y and Lt as the axes. The convex functions represent iso-
revenue curves showing the level of revenue corresponding to the values of Y and Lt 
along it. The concave function Y(Lt) shows the maximum Y corresponding to each value 
of Lt . When Lt  is zero the entire labor force L  can be allocated optimally between LP  
and Lg to maximize Y at Y* by equating the marginal product of labor between the 
provision of public services and employment in the private sector. As Lt is increased the 
residual labor force (L - Lt) falls and so the maximized value Y(Lt) declines, even though 
labor is still being allocated optimally between  public services and private sector 
 4
employment. When Lt is equal to L itself Y must then fall to zero. The concavity of the 
Y(Lt) function follows from diminishing returns in the A(Lg)  and F(LP ,K) functions. 
 
 Revenue is clearly maximized in Figure 1 at α, where the Y(Lt) function is 
tangential to the highest attainable  iso-revenue curve. Y# and Lt#  are the values of Y and 
Lt corresponding to the maximized revenue R#. Having determined R# and Y# we can 
now determine 
 
t# = R#/Y#                  .            (9) 
 
which is the maximum  effective tax rate for the economy. Clearly it is possible for a 
government to set any tax-rate it wants, even a hundred per cent, but that does not mean 
that any tax –rate can actually be implemented. The maximum effective tax rate t#  is 
what can be obtained when the tax base Y# and the tax-collection effort Lt# are such that 
the resulting revenue R# is at the maximum possible level. Note also that an effective tax-
rate is defined at each point along the Y(Lt) function, as the ratio of the revenue level of 
the iso-revenue contour that passes through it and the corresponding value of Y(Lt ) . The 
effective tax-rate clearly rises from zero to t# as Lt rises from zero to Lt#. 
 
 A rational predatory state, however, would not choose the revenue-maximizing 
solution. The appropriate maximand would be the “surplus”, the difference between 
revenue and the costs incurred in generating that revenue. To obtain the surplus-




 The Revenue Function R(Lt) is readily constructed from the iso-revenue map and 
the Y(Lt) function in Figure 1. For each value of Lt we simply note the revenue obtained 
at the corresponding Y(Lt) point. Since Y is maximized for each Lt by allocating the 
remaining labor force (L - Lt) optimally between LP and  Lg, the corresponding revenue is 
also maximized for each  Lt . In Figure 2 the R(Lt) function is a concave function with 
revenue rising at a diminishing rate from zero at  Lt equal zero, to the maximum R# at Lt#, 
and falling thereafter. 
 
 The Expenditure Function E(Lt) is defined as: 
 
 E(Lt ) = w(Lt ) [Lt + Lg (Lt)]        (10) 
where w(Lt ) denotes the after-tax real wage. 
 
 The Expenditure Function is constructed as follows. For each Lt we have the 
corresponding maximized Y(Lt) and the values of Lg and  LP  that are necessary to 
achieve it by equating the marginal  products of labor in the public and the private sectors 
as in 
 
 A′ (Lg)F[(L - Lt – LP ),K] = A(Lg )FL(LP )     (11)                              
 
 Since we know Y(Lt) and R(Lt) for each Lt  we also know the effective tax rate 
t(Lt) for each  Lt . We can therefore determine the after-tax wage w(Lt) as 
 
 w(Lt) = [1- t (Lt)]A(Lg) FL (LP)      (12) 
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 We can now determine E(Lt) since, for each value of  Lt , we  have Lg(Lt ) and 
w(Lt). When  Lt is zero (LP + Lg) is equal to L and national income is maximized at Y*. 
Government expenditure is then equal to wLg*, but there is no tax revenue at all. In  
Figure 2 the distance 0M on the vertical axis indicates expenditure wLg* when   Lt is 
equal to zero. As Lt is increased, the productive labor force (L - Lt) shrinks, and so the 
marginal product of labor in the private sector  A(Lg) FL rises. Both LP and Lg fall when Lt 
rises, so total public employment (Lt +Lg) rises along with the real wage w(Lt) . The E(Lt) 
function is therefore convex upwards from the vertical intercept 0M.  
 
We now define the ‘surplus’ S(Lt) as 
 
 S(Lt) = R(Lt) – E(Lt)        (13) 
 
which is maximized when 
 
 R′ (Lt) = E′(Lt)        (14) 
 
i.e. when the slopes of R(Lt) and E(Lt) are equal, with Lt as the number of tax-collectors 
necessary to achieve this. 
 
 It is instructive to examine R′ (Lt) and E′(Lt) in more detail. The R(Lt) function  
depicted in Figure 2 is the Revenue Extraction Function (2), in which the argument for 
national income, Y, has been ‘maximized out’ by the optimal allocation of (L - Lt) 
between Lg and LP . The derivative R′(Lt) is 
 





 ∂R/∂Y > 0,  ∂Y/∂Lg > 0, dLg /dLt < 0, ∂R/∂Lt > 0    (16) 
 
so that the first term of (15) is clearly negative. This term  indicates the loss of revenue 
due to the decline in national income resulting from the reduction in productive 
employment (L - Lt) consequent to the increase in   Lt. 
 
The last term of (15), which is positive, is the increase in revenue, holding 
national income constant, that is brought about by hiring one more tax-collector. For tax-
collection to be feasible at all this last term must be greater in absolute value than the first  
when  Lt is initially zero. As Lt increases Y falls, as we see in Figure 2, reflecting the 
negative sign of the first term in (15). Revenue, however, increases as Lt increases, as we 
cross higher iso-revenue curves along the Y(Lt) function in Figure 1, until revenue is 
maximized at R# at the point α.   
 
Due to diminishing returns in productive employment the first term in (15) is 
rising as (L - Lt)  gets smaller, while diminishing returns to adding more tax collectors 
causes the second term to keep falling. Eventually the two terms will be equal in absolute 
value, making R′(Lt) equal to zero and maximizing revenue at R#, at the tangency point α 
in Figure 1. 
 
Differentiating (10) with respect to Lt we see that: 
 
E′(Lt) = w(1+ d Lg/dLt ) + (Lt  + Lg)∂w/∂Lt      (17) 
 
Because both Lg  and  LP decline when Lt rises, dLg /dLt is negative, but smaller 
than unity in absolute value, so that the first term in (17) is positive. The second term is 
also positive, because the marginal product of labor in the private sector rises as (L - Lt ) 
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falls. Thus both sides of (14) must be positive when “surplus” is maximized at Lt , which 
proves that it must be to the left of Lt# in Figure 2. We denote the levels of national 
income, revenue, expenditure and “surplus” corresponding to Lt as Y, R, E and S. 
 
Looking at Figure 1 we note that the maximum national income Y* corresponding 
to Lt equal to zero is not feasible since revenue at this point is zero, while expenditure is 
wLg* as indicated by 0M in Figure 2. We see that Lt must increase to L**t before 
sufficient revenue can be raised to exactly offset public expenditure of  w(Lt + Lg) at the 
point where the convex function E(Lt) first intersects the concave function R(Lt). 
National income Y** corresponding to L** t is therefore the maximum feasible national 
income corresponding to the “Philosopher-King” solution of Findlay and Wellisz (2003) 
in the presence of tax-collection costs. 
 
The following relations between the various solution values are readily apparent 
 
L**t < Lt < L#t          (18) 
L**g > Lg > L#g            (!9) 
        
Y**> Y > Y#                        (20)       
 
 It is interesting to note that the size of government as measured by the correspon  
ding effective tax rate is ordered as 
 t**  < t < t#         (21)   
 
  Total public employment in the case of the surplus-maximizing Leviathan  
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(Lt + Lg ) is greater than (L**t + L**g) in the case of the Philosopher-King, even though 
the number of productive public servants  Lg  is less than L**g . The reason is that the 
number of additional tax- collectors hired by the Leviathan exceeds the decline in the 
number of productive public servants. Because the predatory state hires more tax 
collectors, it is larger than the optimally productive state, even though the former 
provides less intermediate public goods than the latter. The consumption available to 
citizens is less not only because national income Y is less than  Y** , but because S is 
positive while S** is zero. 
 
 We now examine the consequences of changes in the efficiency of tax collection 
on both the Philosopher-King and Leviathan regimes.  As we have seen the Revenue 
Extraction Function that we have specified in (2) behaves exactly like a constant returns 
to scale production function, with the ‘output’ being the revenue R and the ‘inputs’ 
national income Y and the number of tax collectors Lt. We assume that changes in tax-
collection efficiency can be represented by  ‘Hicks-neutral’ shifts in the Revenue 
Extraction Function so that an x per cent increase in efficiency means that revenue R 
increases by x per cent with Y and Lt constant. The ‘marginal productivities’ of Y and Lt 
in raising revenue, ∂R/∂Y and ∂/∂Lt, will also increase by x per cent in the case of Hicks-
neutrality, leaving the ratio of ∂R/∂Y and ∂R/∂Lt unchanged at any given ratio Y/Lt of 
national income to the number of tax collectors. 
 
In Figure 1 a Hicks- neutral shift in the Revenue Extraction Function of x per cent 
will leave the Y(Lt) function unchanged, since it depends  only on the production 
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technology of the economy, while simply renumbering the family of iso-revenue curves 
by x per cent. Thus at each Lt and Y(Lt) the revenue will be x per cent higher in Figure 1. 
In Figure 2 the R(Lt) function will also shift upward by x per cent at each value of Lt. To 
see what happens to the derivative R′(Lt) at each point on the R(Lt) function after the 
increase in tax efficiency consider equation (15). The Hicks-neutral shift raises both 
∂R/∂Y and ∂R/∂Lt by x per cent, while leaving ∂Y/∂Lg and dLg/dLt functions unchanged. 
Each of the two terms on the RHS of (15) therefore increases by x per cent, but because 
the absolute value of the positive second term is greater than that of the negative first 
term, R′( Lt) must increase, though by less than x per cent. 
 
 To show that the E(Lt) function shifts down we look at (10) and (12). It is readily 
seen that  Lg and  LP are unchanged at any given  Lt , and so the marginal product of labor 
in the private sector, equal to the real wage before tax , is also unchanged.  Since revenue 
increases at any given Lt and Y(Lt), the effective tax- rate at each Lt goes up, and 
therefore the after-tax real wage w(Lt) goes down for any given Lt. This proves that the 
E(Lt) function shifts  down at every given Lt. It also follows from (16) that E′(Lt).shifts 
down as well at each value of Lt . 
 
 Putting these results together we see that the ‘surplus’ of revenue over public 
expenditure clearly goes up at each value of Lt since revenue rises, while public 
expenditure falls. What will be the impact on L**t , the number of tax- collectors hired by 
the Philosopher-King? Since he now has a positive surplus instead of just breaking even 
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as before the increase in tax- collection efficiency, he will want to reduce his revenue and 
so will cut down on Lt. This will raise national income since Y′( Lt) is negative, hence  Lg 
and  LP both go up in response to the decline in Lt. Total public expenditure will fall 
along with revenue, since the reduction in tax- collectors will be greater than the increase 
in productive public servants. The new value of L**t, at which the budget is balanced, will 
therefore clearly raise public welfare since all of the larger national income is still 
available to the citizens. In the limit the economy will approach the national income Y* 
corresponding to Lt equal zero and the entire labor force allocated only between Lg and 
LP. 
 
 Consider now the impact on L t, the case of the Leviathan. Starting at the original 
value of L t we see that surplus is increased  and that R΄(L t) rises, while E′(Lt) falls. Since 
they have to be equal for his surplus being maximized, by equation (14), he must increase 
Lt and therefore reduce Lg and LP , lowering in the process national income Y(Lt). Since 
the maximized surplus S goes up, and the corresponding Y goes down the public welfare 
measured by (Y - S) is clearly reduced by the increase in efficiency of tax- collection. In 
the limit as tax- efficiency is increased the consumption available to the public (Y -S) 
will be driven down to the ‘anarchy’ level Yo , as defined in Findlay and Wellisz (2003), 
the point at which ‘civil society’ reverts to the ‘state of nature’. 
 
 Thus we see that as tax- collection costs fall the gap between public welfare under 
the Philosopher-King and under the Leviathan increases, rising with the former up to an 
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upper bound Y* and falling under the latter to a lower bound of Yo. Denoting public 
consumption under the two regimes by C** and C we can define an Index of Predation  
π ≡ (C**  - C )/ C**          (22) 
for any level of tax-efficiency common to the two regimes. As we have seen 
 πmax = (C* - Co )/C*        (23) 
where C* equals Y* and Co equals Yo. 
 
 An interesting question that remains is what happens to C** and C as tax 
efficiency declines. By applying the previous reasoning in reverse, we know that the 
R(Lt) function will fall and the E(Lt) will rise. In the limit the concave R(Lt) function will 
just be tangential to the convex E(Lt) function. Surplus will be zero as required by the 
Philosopher-King situation, while R′( Lt) and E′( Lt) will be equal, so that surplus is 
maximized at zero by the Leviathan. At this point C** and C will therefore coincide so 
that in the limit we have zero as the minimum value of the Index of Predation. As tax-
efficiency increases C** rises toward C* as the upper bound, and C falls toward Co as the 
lower bound, so that the Index of Predation π rises from zero to  (C* - Co )/C*  as stated  
in (23). 
 
 We have shown that improvements in the efficiency of revenue- extraction are a 
double- edged sword. In the hands of a benign ruler the benefits are passed to the public 
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in the form of higher consumption that they can enjoy because the socially necessary 
public expenditures on productivity-enhancing activities are less costly to maintain at the 
optimal levels. In the hands of a Leviathan, however, improvements in the efficiency of 
revenue-extraction enhance the ‘parasitic’ activities of the predatory state, enabling it to 
extract more surplus from a shrinking flow of national income to the detriment of the 
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